First Take:  Phenomenology is the branch of philosophy devoted to the study of human consciousness and awareness—that is, how the mind works as it processes experience through the senses, and thus always in relation to objects of perception. In journalism studies, the term “phenomenological” has often been applied to works of reportage that take a first-person point of view, adopt stream of consciousness, and/or emphasize (often intensely) the subjective experience of events, including the emotional or mental state of the observer/reporter.

Deeper: Of course, Phenomenology is a broad, diverse specialization within the field of Philosophy–and not easily encapsulated. Lately, phenomenological approaches to journalism have included modifiers, e.g. “political” or “social” phenomenology, or included discussions on how technologies like cinema or audio recording shapes perception and, in particular, memory.  In fact, famous instances of so-called “New” Journalism are, in some senses, also memoirs.

Meanwhile, for journalists, the label “phenomenological” carries some tension, given that it rubs up against, or challenges, the empirical norms so central to their practice, and often raises the question of how “what is reported” can also serve as an account of what has shaped phenomena in consciousness. And some might simply point out that the term is often thought of as the opposite of “ontological,” a label generally applied to the assumption that things perceived exist in the outer world.  It is sometimes said, therefore, that phenomenological approaches are not consistent with the fundamental journalistic contract of presenting verifiable facts.

As you can tell, while Reading Narrative Journalism respects these views, it does not generally agree with their skeptical view of experimental approaches. Indeed, whenever phenomenological is used as simply a synonym for (a) a subjective “opinion” or (b) experiential “immersion,” much less (c) inventing facts—the term is being misapplied.  Moreover, for the study of narrative journalists, it’s more important to see two implications of the word:

• first, it refers to “phenomena” perceived (not just seen)—in other words, it includes other senses; and

• it refers to the meaning or significance the consciousness of a journalist attaches to such things. In other words, not just what the mind “associates” with what is perceived, but how meanings are organized by the way consciousness, perception or memory function.

This second point, in particular, points back at more conventional notions of verification and “objectivity” in the journalistic mainstream.

Suggested Reading:    David L. Eason, “The New Journalism and the Image-World; Two Modes of Organizing Experience,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 51-65; Maggie Gordon, “Appropriation of Generic Convention:  Film as Paradigm in Michael Herr’s Dispatches,” Literature and Film Quarterly 1 (2000): 16-27; and Smith, David Woodruff, “Phenomenology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/phenomenology/